Antonio Dina & Cristina Di Silvio
The idea that the world is neatly returning to nineteenth century spheres of influence is reassuring, almost nostalgic. Lines on maps, powers controlling their own backyards, relatively stable balances. It is also profoundly wrong. The geopolitics of 2026 is not multipolar in the classical sense, nor can it be organized into coherent regional blocs. It is layered, asynchronous, technologically accelerated, and dominated by actors who do not sit at the UN but in the boardrooms of artificial intelligence companies.
The foreign policy doctrine of the Trump administration, somewhat ironically rebranded as the Donroe doctrine, has given new life to this narrative of spheres of influence. The reorientation toward the Western Hemisphere, selective disengagement from distant theaters, and a willingness to tolerate greater freedom of maneuver for China and Russia in their respective near abroad seem to confirm the picture. But it is a photograph taken with the wrong lens. The United States is not giving up global power projection at all. It is redefining tactical priorities without relinquishing strategic superiority.
The reality is that Washington remains the only actor capable of intervening militarily anywhere on the planet with continuity, logistics, and credibility. The multibillion dollar defense agreement with Taiwan, the persistent military presence in the Indo Pacific, direct or indirect control over outcomes in the Middle East, and the explicit willingness to decide Iran’s political fate are signals of muscular unilateralism, not imperial retreat. The implicit message is simple. The United States chooses where to engage, accepts no external constraints, and considers force a legitimate instrument of global governance. Hardly a regional sphere.
China is playing a different and in some respects more sophisticated game. Militarily it remains a step below the United States, especially in terms of global power projection. A conflict over Taiwan would be anything but a walk in the park, even for Beijing. But economically and industrially the picture changes radically. China has become the main trading partner for the majority of the world’s countries. It controls decisive portions of global supply chains, from energy to critical raw materials, from advanced manufacturing to low cost consumer goods. In the Global South its influence is not ideological but functional. Infrastructure, technology, credit, platforms. It is quiet power, but extremely persistent.
This asymmetry produces a world that cannot be divided into coherent blocs. Japan, South Korea, and Australia remain firmly anchored to American security, yet economically dependent on China. Much of Latin America is still subject to US financial and political influence, but lives on Chinese trade. The idea of a binary choice is an analytical fiction. Most countries are learning to live in a condition of structural double dependence.
Europe represents the most interesting and most fragile case. The possible American disengagement from Ukraine and the gradual erosion of NATO’s centrality have opened a phase of deep strategic uncertainty. But here too the narrative of submission to Moscow does not hold. Russia is too weak economically, too exposed demographically, and too dependent on high risk behavior to become a true European hegemonic pole. If the American umbrella were to shrink drastically, Europe would not become a Russian periphery. It would reorganize itself, laboriously, around a German led axis, with France and the United Kingdom in a role of military and political co command.
This Europe would be less Atlanticist, more autonomous in defense, and paradoxically more globalized economically. Individual states would strengthen direct relations with China, not as a Union but as national actors. An orderly, recognizable fragmentation already under way. Economically weaker countries would slide toward Beijing, not out of political affinity but structural necessity. Here too, no compact sphere of influence. Only unstable equilibria.
Then there is the variable that renders all previous categories obsolete. Technology, and in particular artificial intelligence. The classical model of spheres of influence was born in a world where power was exercised along physical routes, protected by cannons and fleets. The digital economy does not work that way. Data does not respect borders. Artificial intelligence models do not swear allegiance to flags. Western technology platforms, with the significant exception of China, are globalist by design. In many cases they are more powerful than the states that host them.
In the United States the balance of power between government and Big Tech has flipped. It is no longer the state that disciplines companies, but companies that condition the state. This produces a form of global influence that undermines the very idea of a geographic sphere. The digital world is fragmenting not along national borders, but along business models, security levels, spending capacity, and consumer preferences. Artificial intelligence accelerates this process brutally.
The geopolitics of artificial intelligence is driven by two converging forces. The first is the uncontrolled acceleration of companies, driven by competition and profit expectations. The second is the near total absence of effective governance. The few existing barriers are self imposed and aligned with commercial interests. In a context of American unilateralism, mutual distrust among great powers, and systemic inability to build credible institutions, this dynamic is bound to continue until a shock occurs. A technological, financial, or security crisis.
Awareness of the risk is growing even within the sector. Figures like Dario Amodei and Demis Hassabis, hardly luddites, have begun to speak openly about slowing down. This is a meaningful signal. It is also a late one. No one seriously believes that voluntary deceleration is politically or economically sustainable without a crisis to impose it.
Meanwhile, phenomena are emerging that deserve attention. Autonomous agents, self hosted bots, open source models that begin interacting with each other outside monitored spaces are not yet a revolution, but they represent its antechamber. The point is not whether these dynamics are partly performative. The point is that the trajectory is clear. Iteration after iteration, resistance to human control becomes technically plausible. On a one to five year horizon, the probability of systemic incidents is far from negligible.
If and when a crisis arrives, the outcome will not be a return to the Westphalian order. It will be an asymmetric restructuring of power. Artificial intelligence will spread unevenly, widening the gap between haves and have nots, between countries and within countries. The United States and China will slide toward an ever deeper strategic decoupling. Individuals will align themselves with personalized bots that reflect and amplify political, economic, and cultural preferences. Polarization will become a technical function, not merely a social one.
In this context elections become vulnerable, institutions lose centrality, and power concentrates in those who control capital, models, and cognitive infrastructures. Technology companies begin to replace entire sectors of the traditional economy. Sovereign wealth funds understood this long ago and are betting on winner takes all models. The promise of open source decentralization remains possible, but far from guaranteed.
This is the real geopolitical analysis of the global order. Not a world divided into orderly spheres, but an unstable system in which military, economic, and technological power move at different speeds. Artificial intelligence does not strengthen states. It puts them in competition with entities that answer to no electorate. Those who continue to reason only in terms of borders risk fighting the next war with the wrong maps. And history has never been kind to those who mistake nostalgia for analysis.
Cristina Di Silvio USFTI Dir.Int.Rel.EU Spec.Sen.Adv Intl Af. Gulf Guinea C Legal Head North USA EurasiaAfro C.C Dir.Legal Aff.Treaty C.GOEDFA UN Plen.Amb.VWF for all Rap.Perm.EU Fortune Italia Most Powerful Women 2024 WEF-G100
Antonio Dina Technology Artificial Intelligence Strategist | Senior Director | Strategic Think | R&D | Co-Founder Rivista.AI | Expendable
